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ABSTRACT
Theintegrated treatant of opttm1taxationand publicexpenditure
presentedhere is based on the dual relationship between the prices of
private goods and the quantities of public goods. In this paper we derive
analogues of Roy's identity and the Slutsky equation for the case of public
goods. The opti m1provisionof public goods and the level of taxation are
shown to be dual problems.The conditions for optimum public good
provision can be expressed as a ndification of the Samuelson conditions
with extra terms representing (a) the distortionary effect of taxes on the
willingness to pay for the public good, and (b) distributional effects.
The former captures Pigou' a notion of the indirect daniage caused by the
need to finance public expenditure out of distortionary taxes, and we call
this the "Pigou term". In certain cases a very simple benefit—cost ratio
for public projects emerges thatisequivalent to measuring benefits as if
they were taxed.
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1.Introduction
Theanalysis of the conditions for the optimumprovisionof a public
goodwhen its cost must be financed by distortionary taxes datesfrom
Pigou (1947).In this second—best context Pigou argued that the
"indirect damage" caused by distortionary taxes should be added to the
cost of production to obtain the true opportunity cost of the public
good. The indirect cost of raising revenue by distort ionary taxes
should clearly be measured in terms of substitution effects. Hence it
should be possible to express the first—order condition for the optimum
provision of a public good financed by diltortionary taxes as a
modified version of the Samuelson (1954, 1955) conditions for the
first—best case. The sum of the marginal rates of substitution would be
equal to the marginal rate of transformation plus a term representing
the marginal indirect damage. But the existing formal solutions of the
problem (Diamond and Mirriess 1971, Stiglitz and Dasgupta 1971,
Atkinson and Stern 1974, Diamond 1975 and Starrett 1983) do not yield
first-order conditions of this form.Instead the first-order
conditions are expressed in terms of derivatives of total tax revenue
rather than pure substitution effects and are dependent upon the
optimality of the distortionary tax structure.
In this paper we show that the total social marginal cost of a public
good can be expressed as the sum of its production cost and the
marginal efficiency costs of the distortionary taxes required to
finance the public good.The latter is a function solely of
substitution effects and the interpretation of the first-order—3—
condition does not depend upon whether the distortionary taxes are set
at their optimal levels.To some extent this resurrects Pigou's
discussion of the issue.Where Pigou waswrongwasinfailing to
appreciatethat at a second—best optimum the marginal efficiency cost
couldconceivablybe negative.As Atkinson andStern(1974) have
shown,such an outcome might occurifanincrease in the quantityof
thepublic good led to an increased demand for private goods that were
highly taxed.Thispossibility is an illustration of the general
theory of the second—beat, and has been the focus of the critique of
Pigou.In contrast, in this paper the aim is to derive a genera].
result for the optimum provision of public goods that expresses
formally the substance of Pigou' a argument about the need to take into
acount the "indirect damage" resulting from the use of distortionary
rather than lump-sum taxes.
The key to our result is to exploit the duality that exists between the
prices of private goods and the quantities of public goods, and between
the quantities of private goods and the willingness to pay for public
goods.Recognition of this dual relationship leads directly to the
result that the conditions for the optimum provision of public goods
are simply the dual of the many—person Ramsey rule for optimal
conmdity taxes. These conditions may then be given a straightforward
interpretation as a many—person Pigovian rule for optimal public goods
provision.
Althoughneither Pigou (1947) nor Atkinson and Stern (1974) explicitly
allowedfor distributional effects, the model presented here
incorporates differences among agents. The use of distortiona.ry taxes—4—
presupposes such differences if a uniform poll tax is feasible.
In Section 2 some basic duality results for public goods are presented,
and the optimum conditions for the provision of public goods are
derived in Section 3. An example is analysed in Section 4.—5—
2. Duality and Public Goods
Consider an economy comprising agents whose preferences are defined
over leisure, 3 private goods which may be traded at consumer prices 2'
and G public goods in which trade is not possible. These preferences
may be represented by the indirect utility function
V= v(,2' Y) (1)
where 2 is a 3 x 1 vector of consumer prices
2 is a G x 1 vector of the quantities of public goods
y is the agent's exogenous "full" income.
Equation (1) defines the maximum level of utility that an agent can
obtain given his income, market prices, and the coaun vector of public
goods in the economy. Corresponding to (1) is the expenditure function
e =e(E,g, v) (2)
Following King (1983) we may define an agent's imney metric utility, or
"equivalent income", as the convolution of (1) and (2). Equivalent
income is that level of income which, at some reference vector of
consumer prices and public goods provision (,9R),affords the same
level of utility as can be attained under the budget constraint
(2 ,y).
R R =e(2,, v) (3a)
RR f(2,2,212,Y) (3b)—6—
The function f describes individual preferences, and its arguments
denote the budget constraint at which ixney metric utility is being
evaluated.
We shall assume that v and e (and hence f) are continuous functions of
thequantities of the public goods,with first and second derivatives.1
Giventhis assumption we maydefinethe marginal willingness to payfor
the kthpublicgood by the expression
w -—fl— 4 k ()




Combining(4)and(5) yields the following analogue of Roy' s identity
for public goods.
(6)
Comparingthis expression with Roy's identity we see that in (6) the
marginal willingness to pay for the public good replaces the quantity
demanded of the private good and the quantity of the public good
replaces the price of the private good. The sign difference reflects
thefact that v is increasing inand decreasing in 2•—7—
From (2) and (4) may be derived the analogue to Shephard' a lenna
(7)
The compensated and uncompensated demands for private goods are given,
respectively, by
C x. =i— = x.(,, v) i=l. ..J(8)
=x.(,g,y)i=l...J(9)
The compensated effect of a change in the quantity of the )cth public
good on the demand for the ith private good is denoted by 8Bc From
(8) and (9) it is given by
C8x.8x.8x. 8e 1 1 1 S. =—=—+—— (10) ik ag ay
Combining (7) and (10) yields the Slutsky equation for public goods
8x 8x.
(11)—8—
There is a further set of equations relating changes in the quantities
of public goods to changes in the willingness to pay for public goods.
8w. 8w.
+ k 1 8g5ikWkay
—... 2
wheres isthe change in thewillingness topayfor the jth public
good resultingfrom a compensated change in the quantity of the )cth
public good.
Symrietryof the substitutioneffects follows directly from the
assumptionthat the expenditure function is continuous and twice
differentiable. In (11) 8i)c =s,which is the change in the
willingness to pay for the kth public good following a compensated
change in the price of the ith private good. In (12) the own—price
substitution effects, 5Jc' are not necessarily negative. This is
because the expenditure function may not be convex in the quantities of
public goods (see footnote 1).
For a given choice of reference prices and quantities, theequivalent
income function (3b) is defined over actual private goodprices,public
goodquantitiesandincome.There aretwoways in whichcommodity
demands and willingnesses to pay may be obtained fromthe equivalent
incomefunction. First, since it may be thought of as an expenditure
function defined over reference prices then from (7) and (8) demands
are given by differentiating (3a) with respect to reference prices and
quantities and evaluatingthe derivatives at the point where reference
valuesequal actualbudget values. Secondly, we maydifferentiate (3a)—9—
and (3b) with respect to actual prices and quantities and substitute




af ôfaf (14) Wk_ R 8y =2Ig =—10—
3.AMany—Person Piqovian Rule for Public Goods
Armed with the above duality results for public goods we may now
analyse the optimum provision of public goods in an economy where
lump—sum taxation is limited. We shall consider an economy with a
continuum of agents who differ in respect of some attribute. The
individual—specific attribute will be denoted by e,andits
distribution function by F( e)•2 Forexample, individuals mayhave
differentwage rates. The aim of allowing for such differences is
partlyto motivatethe problem (with identical individuals a uniform
polltax is clearly optimal arid this implies the Sainuelson conditions
for public goods), and partly to compare the result for the optimum
provision of public goods with the many—person Ramsey rule for optima].
corrmiodity taxes.
The government is assumed to choose levels of publicgoodsprovision
arid tax rates in order to niaximise a social welfare function defined
over individual levels of equivalent income.3For simplicity we
assume also that the social welfare function is additively separable
arid isgiven by
SW=w[y(e)J'(e) (15)
The concavityof W describesthe degree ofaversion to inequality
in money metric utility levels.
Thegovernment'sbudget constraint is that total percapitarevenue
fromalltaxes, r, must be at least as great a.s percapitapublic
expenditure— 11—
r£. (16)
where c is a G x 1 vector of the (constant) per capita marginal costs
of the public goods.
The value of r depends upon the particular tax instruments available to
the government. We assume that the feasible set of taxes comprises a
uniform poll tax, denoted by 2, and uniform specific commodity taxes, t
on the J private goods. Leisure is taken as the numeraire and is
assumed to be untaxed.
Producer prices are assumed to be constant, and the relationship
between producer and consumer prices (denoted by and 2 respectively)
is given by4
(17)
Denoting the mean demand for good i bywe have that
J r=2+ E t.k. (18)
i=l
The Lagrangian corresponding to the government' s optimisation problem
is
Je w{yE(e)]r(e)
+ A+t. —lCk (19)
where A denotes the multiplier corresponding to the government's budget
constraint and is the shadow price of government revenue.— 12—
Thefirst order conditions for the optimum levels of the three sets of
policy instruments (i) commodity tax rates, (ii) quantities of the
public goods, and (iii) the level of the poll tax (or subsidy), are the
following. They use the facts that 8f/82 =—af/8yand 8f/8t =ef/apj.













FollowingDiannd(1975) and Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980, p387) we
definethe total social marginalvaluationof incomeofan individual
withattribute9 by
W' 8f J 8x.
(23)
In this expression all of the derivatives depend upon 9. Thevalueof
b(9) is the money value tothe plannerof an additional unit ofincome
in the hands of a person with attribute 9. The first term measures the
value to the planner of the increase in the agent 'swelfare, and the
second term measures the money gain to the government resulting from— 13—
theincreased taxes paid by the agent when he spends his additional
income.
The Slutsky equation for private goods is
ax. ax. 1 1 —=s..—x— (24) ap. ijjay
substitutingthisequation into (20)(noting sj = and using
equation(13) andthedefinition of b( e) in (23) yieldsthemany—person
Ramsey rule for opti.. 1conmdity taxes
r r
b(s)x.(e)dP(e)= t.s..(e)dF(6) j=1.. .J(25)
Je i=lJe




Itis possible to rewrite (25) so that it is a natural extension of the
simple Ramsey rule for an economy of identical individuals by defining











Substituting (28) into (25) yields the alternative form of the
many—person Ramsey rule (Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980, p387)
E t.s..(e)dF(e) iJe = (1—b)—b4'.
j=l.. .J(29)
This condition statesthat thepropoxtionate reduction in the
compensated demand for good jresultingfrom the imposition of the
commodity tax structure is equal to a constant that is negatively
related to the covariance between the consumption of good jandthe
social marginal value of income . Themore consumption is
concentrated aixng those with a high total social marginal valuation of
income, the smaller the reduction in demand that should result from the
imposition of the optimal tax structure. This result is well—known and
is presented here solely for purposes of comparison with the case of
public goods for which there is an exactly analagous condition.
The first—order condition for the optimal poll tax implies (from (22),
(23) and (26) that
(30)— 15—
Thisequation has the simple interpretation that if the government can
make uniform lump—sum transfers then the average value of the total
social marginal valuation of income must equal the average cost of the
marginal transfer, namely unity. Note that a linear income tax can be
thought of as a combination of a poll tax (or subsidy) arid uniform
commodity tax rates. It is, therefore, a special case of the tax
structure examined here.6
The first—order condition for the optimum provision of public goods,
equation (21), may be combined with the analogue of Roy's identity,






e e k=1. ..G (31)
This equation for optimum public goods provision is exactly analagous
to equation (25) for optimal conmodity taxes. The quantities of the
private good in the latter are replaced by the wi].lingnesses to pay for
the public good in the former, and the average quantity demanded is
replaced by the cost of production. The duality between the prices and
quantities of private and public goods means that (25) and (31) are
dual to each other and can be interpreted as particular cases of a
single general condition for optimum public intervention.
We may define the normalised covariance of the total social marginal






[b(e) —b} Wk = b Ckk (33)
Substituting(33)into(31) yields
Ck
(1- )- b k
k=1...G (34)
where wkis the mean willingnesstopayfor the ]cth publicgood.
Wemay think ofthis as a many—personPigovian rule for the optimum
provision of public goods. It states that the (approximate)
proportionate change in the compensated willingness to pay for the )cth
public good that results from the imposition of the distortionary
couidity tax structure is equal to a constant that is negatively
related to the covariance between the willingness to pay for the public
good and the total social marginal valuation of income. The greater
is the relative willingness to pay of those with ahigh total social
marginalvaluation of income the larger is the optimal proportionate
reduction in the marginal willingness to pay. One would expect that— 17—
thiswould normally be associated with a larger supply of the public
good. Equation (34) is dual to the many—person Ramsey rule given by
equation(29), with the exception that the ratio enters intothe
right—handside of (34)because,asnoted above, in the government
revenue constraint the average quantities of private goods are dual to
the marginal production costs of public goods rather than their mean
willingnesses to pay.This affects the interpretation of (34).
Consider the case in which agents are identical (4 =0)andthere is
no poll tax.The Pigou rule states that for small deviations from
first-best (where ck =) theproportionatechange in the compensated
willingness to pay is the same for all public goods. reover, it is
exactly equal to the proportionate reduction in the compensated demands
for all private good.s (equal to 1—b) from (29)).Forlarge changes,
however, the right—hand side of (34) will depend upon the nature of the
public good.
The final step in the analysis is to compare the second—best optimum
described by (31) with the Samuelaon first—best conditions. The latter
state that in a first—best the sumofthe marginal rates of
substitution between the public good and the numeraire must be equal to




Using(33) we may rewrite (31) to give
JeWk(9) dF(e) =Ck+ [(l_b)k_ b Ckk} —
i=1
tiSki (36>— 18—
where§ is the mean value of sj (and equals jc).
Equation (36) has an appealing interpretation. The difference between
the first and second best is that in the latter the effective cost of
the public good is equal to its production cost plus two additional
terms. The first of these terms relates to the distributional effects
of the public good provision, and with the poll tax set optimally (b=l)
its value as a proportion of production costs is exactly equal to minus
the covariance between the willingness to pay and the social marginal
valuation of income.The second term we may call the Pigou term
because it measures the distortion to the aggregate willingness to pay
resulting from the use of distortionary taxes to finance government
expenditure.It consists solely of substitution effects and isa
measureof the "indirect damage" caused by taxation. For this reason
it seems to capture the essence of Pigou's argument.Where Pigou's
intuition let him down was in suposing that the Pigou term must
necessarily be positive.By the usual second—best argument it is
possible that the shadow cost of the public good should be lower than
its value as given by the Samuelson condition because the provision of
an extra unit may reduce distortions elsewhere. Examples have been
provided by Atkinson and Stern (1974).But in many cases itis
possibleto prove that the Pigou term is positive and we provide
examplesbelow. It should be noted that theformulation in (36) and the
definition of the Pigou term do not in anyway dependupon the
couiditytax structure being set optimally.Themany—person Pigou
ruleholds for any distortionary tax structure in exactly the same way
that the many—person Ramsey rule foroptimalcommodity taxes does not
depend on whether the revenue raised is spent optimally. This follows
directly from the duality of the two problems but the existing
treatment of the optimum provision of public goods in the literature— 19—
leansheavily on the conditions for optiznality of the tax structure to
interpret the first—order conditions for public goods.Such an
approach is unnecessarily restrictive.
we conclude by considering some special cases that throw further light
on the general second—best optimum and the nature of the Pigou term.
First, it is easy to check that (36) is consistent with the Samuelson
conditions. In the first—best when unrestricted lump—sum taxation is
possible b(s) =1,for all e.Thisimplies that 'Jc =0,b =1 and
tj =0 (for all i) and with these values (36) reduces to (35).
Secondly, when agents are identical (36) yields the simple Pigou rule
J
ck tiSki
J v)(e) dF() =
i.—l (37)
e b
It is obvious that if a poll tax is fea.sib].e no conmrdity taxes would
be employed and the first—best would be attainable.If, however, the
poll tax was infeasible then from (22) 0 <b1, and the effective
cost exceeds the production cost modified by the Pigou term.
Finally, and of most interest, consider the case of equalad valorem
coimnodity tax rates and a poll tax (such that b=l). This corresponds
to a linear income tax. The duality formulation allows us to derive a
very simple expression for the optimum in this case.Let the common
tax rate as a percentage of the tax—inclusive consumer price
(equivalent to the constant marginal income tax rate) be—20--
t.
t=—i i=l ...J (38)
pi
The Pigou term, denoted by P, becomes
'7 P—t E p1 (39)
i=].
If the public good is a substitute for expenditure on private goods as a
whole, then the Pigou term must be positive.From equation (4) and the





where s is the ccxzensated effect of an extra unit of the kth public good
on labour supply. The Pigou term becomes
P =t(
—i.1c) (41)
Substituting (41) into (36) and setting the poll tax to its optimal value






Ifthe degree of substitutability or couiplementarity of the public good and
leisure is very small, then the criterion for the provision of public goods
with a linear income tax is very simple. The marginal benefit—cost ratio,
denoted by r, required to justify a project is given by
(43)
The benefits, adjusted for distributional effects, should be equatedwith
the production cost grossed up by the marginal tax rate. Alternatively,
the benefits should be measured net of tax. In other words the Treasury
should instruct those responsible for project appraisal tocalculate
benefits as if they were taxed at the same rate as private sector incomes.
The distributional adjustment is defined in terms of thetotal social
marginal valuation of income as given by (23).Where social preferences
ta)ce no account of the distribution of welfare, and areconcerned solely
with "efficiency" then only the second term in (23) varies acrossagents.
In this case (arid with uniform coumKdity tax rates) asufficient condition
for Z' to be zero is that the marginal propensity to consumeleisure is the
same for all agents .'Therequired marginal benefit—cost ratio is then
project—independent and is given simply by r =1/(l—t).Although the value
of t depends upon the full general equilibrium solution, thisformulation
gives a simple rule of thumb for the implementationof optimal public
expenditure decisions. The cost should be grossed—up bythe tax rate to
allow for the marginal deadweight loss of financing the publicgood by
distortiOflary taxes. For example, with a tax rateof 50 per cent, the
benefits (sum of the willingnesses to pay) would have to exceedtwice the—22—
cost to justify provision of the public good. An alternative interpretation
is that the benefits of a project should be thought of as equivalent to
other forms of income and the net of tax value taken as the relevant value.
To surise, equation (43) describes the optimal marginal benefit—cost
ratio under the following assumptions:
(i)uniform couinodity taxes, or a linear income tax, are employed. It is
not required that uniform tax rates be optimal, merely that they
charaterise the tax system used.
(ii) the public good is, on average, neither a complement not a substitute
for leisure. Any pattern of complementarity or substitutability
between private goods and the public good is allowed.— 23—
4.An ..-p].e
Toillustrate the power of the duality formulation of the problem, we
shallexamine a simple example, similar to that used by Atkinson and
Stern (1974), and show that explicit expressions may be derived for the
optimum provision of the public good and the marginal benefit—cost
ratio as functions of the underlying preference and technology
parameters.Consider an economy of identical individuals whose
preferences are defined over a single public good, leisure and two
private goods. Preferences are assumed to be Cobb—Douglas in form and
described by the indirect utility function (with the wage rate
normalised to unity).
12
v(p1, p2, g, y) =p1p2g ' 0
(X]Ja21 (44)
f3 0
Therepresentative consumer' s budget constraintis8
p1x1+p2x2+(—L)=Y (45)
where L is hours worked, HM is the maxi.mum number of hours available for
work, and y is exogenous full income.Producer prices are assumed
constant.We denote the reference prices of the private goods and the
reference quantity of the public good by R1, P1z and gR respectively.
Prom (3) and (44) the level of equivalent income is given by—24—
R a1RU2 R
p1 p2 g —— — .y (46)
p1 p2 g
From (13) and (46) the demands for the private goods and the supply of







From (14) and (46) the marginal willingness to pay for the public good
(denoted by w) is
(48)
g
In the first-best case where the public good can be financed by a
nondistortionary lump—sum tax then at the optimum
w=c (49)
Exogenous income is reduced by the amount of the lump—sum tax which, from
the government revenue constraint, must be equal to the cost of providing
the public good (cg). Hence (48) and (49) yield the first—best level of
public good provision, g*, as— 25—
g*__ (50)
l+j3 C
Considernow the second—best case in which only comnodity taxes may be
employed.
The Ramsey rule (29) implies that
t1s11 + t2s12= =t1s21+ t2s22
(51)
xl x2 -
whereb is the social marginal value of income. The substitution effects





The cobb-Douglas preferences described by (44) imply equal co1IIKdity tax
rates (as a proportion of the producer price) on the two private goods.
The comnn tax—inclusive rate of tax is given from the government budget
constraint and optimal coimmnodity demands as
cg t= (54)
From (37) the first—order condition for the provision of the public good










Substituting(53)and(57)into (55)yields the following simple result.
Cw=— (58)
l—t
At the second—best opt2inuin the use of distortionary comndity taxes
increases the relevant marginal cost.In effect, the marginal cost is
grossed up by the rates of tax or, equivalently, the marginal benefits must
becomputedas ifthey were taxed.
Tosolve explicitlyfor the optimal quantityof the public good substitute
(48) and (54) into (58).This yields the second—best optimalquantity,




Comparingthis expression with (50)
g (a1 + a2)(l + 13) —= <1 (60)
g* a1+a2+13
Less of the public good is supplied at the second—best optifflum.
substituting (59) into (54) gives an explicit expression for the optimum
tax rate
'3 t = (61)
Together with (58) this defines the marginal benefit—cost ratio to be used




Thewelfare loss that results from the inability to use lump—sum taxes may
be calculated by evaluating (46) at the first—and second—best optima. It
is important to note that the loss arises from the impact of the
distortionary tax structure on both the pattern of demand for private goods
and the provision of the public good. As Hines (1984) has pointed out,
conventional measures of the impact of distortionary taxes ignore their
effect on the provision of public goods by examining a switch from
distortionaxy to lump—sum taxation holding public goods provisionconstant.
In our example the total welfare loss can be decomposed quite simply. When
calculating iney metric utility we take as reference prices and quantities
the producer prices of private goods and the first—best quantity of the— 28—
publicgood. With these choices of reference values uney metric utility
in the first—best is given (from (46)) by
y*=y_cg* j (63)
In the second—best optimum the prices of private goods are equal to
producer prices grossed up by the tax rate t, and public good provision is




Substituting from (50), (59) and (61) gives a measure of the welfare loss






In contrast, the welfare level that can be achieved by replacing coimxdity
taxes by lump-sum taxes holding revenue and the quantity of the public good




(a1+cx2) (a1+a2+/3) 1 (67)
13 + (a1+a2)(1—13)—29—
Thetotal welfare gain from removing distortionazy taxes can be decomposed
into thatpartattributable to the distortion of the pattern of demand for
private goods and that part attributable to the distortion of public goods
provision. This is shown by
YE** YE**'E =___ — (68)
YE*
5. Conclusions
The key to ourresultsis the dualrelationship betweenthe priceof
privategoods and thequantityofpublic goods. We derived analogues of
Roy's identity, Shephard '8lnand the Slutaky equation for public goods.
From these we showed that the determination of optim1 tax ratesand the
optimalprovision of public goods are dual problems.An integrated
treatment of optimal taxation arid public expenditure follows naturally.
The first-order conditions for public goods provision can be expressed as a
modification of the Samuelson conditions with extra terms representing (a)
the distortionaiy effect of taxes on the willingness to pay for the public
good (the "Pigou term"), and (b) the distributional effectsof the
government budget. Our analysis of the Pigou term (defined as the sumof
substitution effects) captures Pigou 'a notion of the i ndi rect damage
resulting from the need to finance public expenditure by distortionary
taxes.In some special cases we showed that the consequence of the
indirect damage is that the benefits of a public project should be measured
as if they were taxed.— 30—
F0S
1.In the case of private goods the properties of continuity and
differentiability follow from the fact that because of substitution
possibilities the expenditure function is concave in prices.In the
case of public goods the analagous result would be that the expenditure
function was convex in the quantities of the public goods. But this is
a statement about preferences for public goods and cannot be derived
from the assumption of optimising behaviour on the part of individual
agents as in the case of private goods. To prove that the expenditure
function is concave in the prices of private goods requires the
assumption of consistent individual choice over bundles of private
goods (see, for example, Deaton and Muellbauer 1980 pp.39—40 and Varian
1978 p.29), butindividual agents have no such choices to makewhen it
comes topublic goods. Chiappori (1984) andsines(1984) have
independently noted the dualitybetween privateandpublicgoods, but
intheir formulation indirect utility is defined over the willingness
to pay for public goods rather than quantities. The problem with this
is that the willingness to pay is a function of preferences exactly
analogous to the "virtual price" of a rationed private good.
2. For notational simplicity we take etobe a scalar. The generalisation
is straightforward.
3. Defining social welfare over levels of money metric utility rather than
over indirect utilities, for example, makes it possible to distinguish
the cardinality of social preferences from the form of individual
preferences.
4. The assumption that producer prices are constant may be relaxed in a
straightforward manner provided that any pure profits that result may
be taxed at a rate of 100 per cent (Diannd and Mirrlees 1971).
5. The left—hand side of (29) is only approximately equalto the
proportionatereduction incompensated demand for large taxes.
6. For a discussion of nonlinear income taxes see AtkinsonandStiglitz
(1976).
7. An alternative sufficient condition is thatthe willingness to pay
forthe public goodisuncorrelated with full income.
8. The preferences defined by (44)exhibit nonsatiation.
9.If labour supply is non—negative then a1 + a2 1.
10.The reader mayeasilycheck that ifhouseholdsare notidentical but
differ in respect of their endowments, the tax rate and marginal
benefit—cost ratio are unchanged and that the quantity of the public
good isgiven by (59) with incomereplaced by mean income.— 31—
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